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DO UNIVERSITIES HAVE A SPECIAL DUTY OF CARE TO
PROTECT STUDENT-ATHLETES FROM INJURY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has watched or participated in sports knows that
an athlete's career can come to an end in an instant.1 An athlete
may be injured, or worse, killed while participating in sports.2 In
1. See Richard Obert, Suffering the Sidelines Injuries Are More Than Dealing With
Pain, THE ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1997, at Cll. "In a split second, dreams can
shatter." Id. Physical injuries, such as concussions and broken bones, are an una-
voidable risk in any sport. See id. Injuries do not discriminate, there is no trend to
them. See id. "Participation in sports is inherently dangerous, and the risk of in-
jury is manifest. Physical contact is a fundamental and sanctioned component of
many sports." Gerard T. Noce and Frans J. von Kaenel, Individual and Institutional
Liability for Injuries Arising From Sports and Athletics: Participants, Coaches, Clubs and
Schools May Incur Liability for Sports-Related Injuries, but Different Standards Apply, 63
DEF. COUNS. J. 517 (1996).
The nature of sports requires that competitive athletes be willing to risk their
physical well being if they hope to succeed. See MatthewJ. Mitten, Team Physicians
and Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 129, 133 (1993). The result is that athletes take unnecessary risks, believing
that they are invincible. See id.
2. Death and serious injuries occur annually in competitive sports. See Mitten,
supra note 1, at 133. Hank Gathers is perhaps the best known student-athlete who
died while participating in a sport. See Barbara J. Lorence, The University's Role
Toward Student-Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obligation, 29 DuQ. L. REv. 343, 343 (1991).
Gathers was considered by many commentators to be one of the "best college bas-
ketball players in the country." Id. After making a slam dunk during Loyola Mary-
mount's semifinal's game, Gathers, Loyola's star forward, collapsed. See id. One
hour and forty minutes later, Gathers was dead. See id. Unfortunately, this was not
the first time that he had collapsed while playing basketball for Loyola. See id.
Gathers had collapsed only three months earlier and began taking medication af-
ter tests indicated an irregular heartbeat. See id. Gathers continued to play basket-
ball but soon discovered that he was no longer "a dazzling scorer and rebounder."
Id. at 343-44. After Gathers' death, rumors abounded that he had stopped taking
his medication and that Loyola coaches were not only aware of it, but they en-
couraged it and continued to allow him to play. See id. See also Kerry L. Hollings-
worth, Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College: What Duty Does a University Owe Its
Recruited Athletes?, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 711, 715 (1994). Gathers' family filed
multimillion dollar lawsuits against Loyola's coach, physicians and athletic trainers.
See Mitten, supra note 1, at 129. The family alleged that Gathers was misdiagnosed
andIA notU .Lully IIUluIInI.L a tnjtU flt 3Cf 1t-lnht ll . 1.1113 tL1 .- jUl tutl-
more, the lawsuits alleged that due to pressure from the coach, physicians had
given Gathers a lower dosage of medication so that he could continue to play at
the higher level to which he was accustomed. See id. at 130.
Another widely publicized case in which a student-athlete was severely injured
involved Citadel linebacker Marc Buoniconti. See Mitten, supra note 1, at 130.
Buoniconti was paralyzed during a football game. See id. Buoniconti unsuccess-
fully sued the team physician for allowing him to play with an injury. See id. Gath-
ers' death and Buoniconti's paralysis are just two examples of the serious con-
sequences associated with participating in a team sport. See id. at 131.
(219)
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college sports, the issue arises as to whom, if anyone, should be
held responsible for the injury or death of a student-athlete. What
if evidence exists that the athlete was already suffering from an in-
jury or disability and chose to risk aggravating the injury by playing?
This Comment explores these questions.
Specifically, Section II examines the duty of care that a univer-
sity owes its athletes . Section II also explores the three traditional
theories that students have used to sue universities. 4 In addition,
Section II examines the special relationship that exists between stu-
dent-athletes and universities. 5 Section III of this Comment consid-
ers the conclusions of various courts in cases that involved student-
athletes and universities, specifically, when a duty of care existed. 6
Finally, Section III considers the roles and duties of coaches toward
their athletes. 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Duty of Care Owed to Students
No duty of care exists between entities unless there are special
circumstances as a matter of law. 8 Therefore, universities owe no
3. For a discussion of the duty of care a university owes its athletes, see infra
notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the three traditional theories students use to sue univer-
sities, see infra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the special relationship between student-athletes and
universities, see infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of different courts' rulings regarding the duty of care that
a university owes its student-athletes, see infra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the duties that coaches owe to athletes, see infra notes
128-48 and accompanying text.
8. See Andrew Rhim, The Special Relationship Between Student-Athletes and Colleges:
An Analysis of a Heightened Duty of Care for the Injuries of Student-Athletes, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L. J. 329, 331 (1996); see also Monica L. Emerick, The University/Student-
Athlete Relationship: Duties Giving Rise to a Potential Educational Hindrance Claim, 44
UCLA L. REv. 865, 884-85 (1997). In determining whether a duty of care exists,
courts consider many factors:
(1) the social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises as com-
pared with the risk involved in it's conduct;
(2) the likelihood of injury from the existence of the activity;
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury;
(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered;
(5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
(6) the policy encouraging prevention of future harm;
(7) the magnitude or difficulty of guarding against the injury;
(8) the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant; and
(9) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Emerick, supra note 8, at 885.
[Vol. 6: p. 219
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A UNIVERSITY's DUTY TO STUDENT-ATHLETES
inherent duty of protection to their students.9 Historically, courts
have refused to hold universities liable for injuries sustained while a
student is on school grounds, finding that there are no special cir-
cumstances or relationships that impose a duty of care toward a
student on a university.10
Courts have been reluctant to find a special relationship be-
tween students and universities under the view that university stu-
dents are self-sufficient adults.1 1 However, courts have recognized
three areas in which universities owe a duty to private students. 12
The three theories under which courts have recognized such a duty
are the: (1) in loco parentis doctrine; 13 (2) landowner-invitee the-
ory;14 and (3) student-college relationship as special. 15
1. In Loco Parentis Doctrine
The common law in loco parentis doctrine emerged during a
period when universities were stressing discipline and structure.' 6
Under the doctrine, a university owes students a duty of protection
9. See Edward H. Whang, Necessary Roughness: Imposing A Heightened Duty of Care
on Colleges For Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS L. J. 25, 33 (1995). Under com-
mon law principles, there is no duty imposed on a university to protect its students
absent a special relationship. See id.
10. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 135 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting stu-
dent-plaintiff's contention that presence of alcohol at school sponsored event im-
posed duty on college to protect student); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d
413, 416 (Utah 1986) (holding university has no special duty to protect student
from consequences of voluntary intoxication when during prior occasion of
drunken disorientation, student told university representative that this was normal
behavior for her); Whitlock v. University of Denver, 744 P.2d 54, 59 (Colo.
1987) (rejecting student-plaintiff's claim that college had duty to supervise stu-
dents' conduct in using trampoline owned by fraternity recognized by university);
Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
college not liable for injuries suffered during intramural softball game); Van Mas-
trigt v. Delta Tau Delta, 573 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding univer-
sity not liable for criminal acts occurring on campus in case involving death at
fraternity party); Smith v. Day, 538 A.2d 157, 159 (Vt. 1987) (holding university not
responsible for on-campus shooting since colleges not liable for volitional criminal
acts for which they had no notice).
11. See id See also Lorence, supra note 2, at 346. Federal and state courts have
begun to view students as adults who are capable of taking care of themselves and
taking responsibility for their decisions. See id.
12. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 332.
13. For a discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine, see supra notes 16-23 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the landowner-invitee theory, see supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the student-college relationship as special, see supra
notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
16. See Philip M. Hirshberg, The College's Emerging Duty to Supervise Students: In
LocoParentis in the 1990's, 46 WASH. U.J. UPn. & CONTEMp. L. 189, 194 (1994). The
courts deferred to colleges and universities and allowed a great amount of leeway
1999]
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because the university stands "in place of the parents."' 7 Because
the university stood in the place of the parents, courts were reluc-
tant to intervene just as they were reluctant to allow a child to sue a
real parent.' 8 Rather, courts preferred to defer to universities and
"adopted a hands-off policy regarding decisions of colleges in both
academic and non-academic matters." 19 As "parents," universities
have the power to regulate the conduct of their students and, in
return, they have a duty to protect students from harm. 20
Beginning in the 1960s, in the wake of social and political
changes that led to increased independence for college students,
the in loco parentis doctrine began to lose its popularity.21 The
decline in the popularity of the doctrine also resulted from the
emergence of the German system of higher education which pro-
vided for "large and diversified institutions, and exhibited little con-
cern for the private life of the student."22 After these societal
changes, courts consistently refused to use the in loco parentis doc-
trine as a basis to protect universities from liability to students.23
in developing what universities believed to be necessary restrictive policies. See id.
at 194-95.
17. See id. at 195. Colleges were considered to be responsible for securing the
"physical and moral welfare" of their students, much as parents were before send-
ing their children off to college. See id.
18. See id. citing ( )Illinois ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866)
("A discretionary power had been given [to college authorities] to regulate the
discipline of their college in such manner as they deem proper .... We have no
more authority to interfere than we have to control the domestic discipline of a
father in his family.").
19. Rhim, supra note 8, at 333.
20. See Whang, supra note 9, at 29. The doctrine developed in the 1800s at a
time when college students were generally seen as children who required guidance
and protection by the colleges. See id at 29-30; see also Rhim, supra note 8, at 332.
The relationship between students and universities was generally characterized as
custodial. See Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 195.
21. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 333. Courts began granting students more
rights, refusing to defer to unconstitutionally restrictive university policies. See
Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 197. Changing societal attitudes were reflected by the
enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowering voting rights to 18, the Viet-
nam War and the Civil Rights Movement. See id at 197-98; see also Whang, supra
note 9, at 30; Lorence, supra note 2, at 346.
22. Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 196. The German model prospered for nu-
merous reasons. See id. First, it allowed for the education of a much larger body of
students. See id. Second, it accommodated soldiers attending college on the G.I.
bill. See id. Finally, the baby boom created a need for larger and more compre-
hensive universities. See id. at 197.
23. See Whang, supra note 9, at 30-31. In recent years, some have called for a
return to the doctrine because of increased reckless behavior on college campuses.
See Rhim, supra note 8, at 333.
[Vol. 6: p. 219
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2. Landowner-Invitee Theory
In general, students have had more success suing their univer-
sities under the landowner-invitee theory than they have had under
the in loco parentis doctrine. 24 This success is attributable to the
"special relationship of landowner-invitee between colleges and stu-
dents."25 To impose liability under the landowner-invitee theory,
the crime at issue must have been reasonably foreseeable.2 6
Although courts are more willing to impose liability under this the-
ory, they have refused to hold that a duty of care arises automati-
cally when an injury is reasonably foreseeable. 27 Furthermore,
courts have only been willing to impose liability for injuries sus-
tained on-campus, not off-campus.2 8 In sustaining an injury on-
campus, a student can argue that the university, as a landowner,
owes them a duty of care. 29 When a student is off-campus, the uni-
versity is no longer a landowner and no such duty of care exists.30
24. See id. One of the reasons for this was the increased problem of rape and
sexual assault on college campuses. See Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 205-06. Courts
were forced to find an avenue in which universities owed a duty to their students.
See id.
25. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 333. In a landlord-invitee special relationship,
landowners have a duty to protect invitees. See Whang, supra note 9, at 31.
26. See Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 206. This often requires a finding of "ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of prior, similar acts." Id.
27. See Whang, supra note 9, at 32. This action by the courts, although al-
lowing a cause of action, is very limited. See id. Even if the injury was highly fore-
seeable, such as an alcohol-related injury, courts will not automatically impose
liability. See id. Baldwin v. Zoradi was one of the first cases to deal with the issue of
an alcohol-related injury. See Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). The California Court of Appeals refused to impose a duty on the university
to control student consumption of alcohol. See id. at 819. Universities are aware
that students consume alcohol and that this increases the risk of injury, but univer-
sities have not been held responsible for protecting students from these types of
highly foreseeable injuries. See id. at 818; see also Rhim, supra note 8, at 334.
28. See Whang, supra note 9, at 32. This demonstrates the court's reluctance
to premise their results on the idea that it is a "special-college relationship" which
gives rise to a duty of care. See id. at 32. As landowners, universities are only re-
sponsible for those injuries that were foreseeable and occurred on their land. See
id. By recognizing a duty when the injury occurs off-campus, the rationale behind
the landowner-invitee theory no longer applies. See id. The injury is not occurring
while the invitee (student) is on the landowner's (university's) land. See id.
29. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 334. In the event of an off-campus injury, the
university is no longer the landowner. See id. If this were applied strictly to ath-
letes, then colleges would not be liable for injuries. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 334.
As a result, universities would not be liable to student-athletes for injuries resulting
at an off-campus sporting event. See id.
30. See id.
1999]
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3. The Student-College Relationship As Special
Absent a special relationship, a defendant owes no duty to a
plaintiff.3 1 When a special relationship does exist, however, a de-
fendant owes a plaintiff an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff
from harm and failure to act will constitute nonfeasance . 2 Thus,
colleges do not owe a duty of care to their students unless a special
relationship exists between universities and their students. 33
Special relationships often exist because one party is depen-
dent on the other party or the parties are mutually dependent.3 4
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists such special relationships
based on dependency, including common carrier and passenger or
innkeeper and guest.3 5 This list is not exhaustive, however, and
courts may find a special relationship in other circumstances such
31. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. To bring a claim against a
defendant, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
requisite duty of care. See James Kennedy Ornstein, Broken Promises and Broken
Dreams: Should We Hold College Athletic Programs Accountable for Breaching Representa-
tions Made in Recruiting Student-Athletes?, 6 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 641, 657 (1996).
32. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 886. Although the "line between misfeasance
and nonfeasance is not always clear," the basic question to consider is:
... whether the defendant has acted in such a way and placed himself
into such a relationship with the plaintiff that he has begun to affect the
interests of the plaintiff adversely, a [mis]feasance, or whether the de-
fendant has merely failed to confer a benefit upon the plaintiff, a
nonfeasance.
Id.
33. See Whang, supra note 9, at 33. Liability because of a special relationship
has not been premised on the "unique" relationship of a university and its stu-
dents. See Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a
Cause of Action Be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 DENY. U. L. REv. 57, 85 (1992).
There is no doubt that the student-university relationship is arguably unique. See
id. The university is the center of its students' lives. See id. Nevertheless, courts are
reluctant to create a special relationship because they believe that students are
adults who are capable of taking care of themselves and that universities should
not be insurers of student safety. See id.
34. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 887; see also Lorence, supra note 2, at 353.
35. See id. The Restatement provides:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable
action,
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they
are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by
others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar
duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the cus-
tody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his
normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 314A, 320 (1965).
[Vol. 6: p. 219
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as the university situation.3 6 Recently, there has in fact been a shift
in tort law toward expanding the affirmative duties placed on large
social institutions, including universities.3 7 Courts have continued
to refuse, nevertheless, to find a special relationship between uni-
versities and their students and to impose a duty of care on
universities. 3 8
B. Duty of Care Owed to Student-Athletes by Colleges
As discussed above, courts have been generally reluctant to
find a special relationship between students and universities.3 9
Therefore, courts have been unlikely to impose liability on universi-
ties for breaching a duty of care. 40 When students are also athletes,
however, the relationship changes. 41 Student-athletes provide uni-
versities with many financial advantages. 42 Student-athletes are dis-
tinct from private students for three reasons: "(1) colleges do not
view student-athletes as employees while these students generate
both economic and non-economic benefits for colleges; (2) stu-
dent-athletes are clearly distinct from private students; and (3)
student-athletes and colleges have a 'special relationship' character-
36. See id The comment provides: "[t] he relations listed are not intended to
be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative
action for the aid or protection of another may be found." Id.
37. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 887. The result is a shift from the previous
'no liability" rule to a new rule of "liability for negligence." Id.
38. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 334-35. Courts refuse to impose a duty of care
based largely on the same reasons why they refuse to accept the in loco parentis
doctrine. See id. Courts see students largely as autonomous. See id. at 335. Col-
leges "are educational institutions not custodial ones." Rhim, supra note 8, at 335
(quoting Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 1986)).
39. See infra notes 8-36 and accompanying text.
40. See Whang, supra note 9, at 36. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135, 135 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting student's claim that college had duty to protect
student at school sponsored event where alcohol was present); Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1986) (no duty of care because of educational
not custodial relationship); Whitlock v. University of Denver, 744 P.2d 54, 59
(Colo. 1987) (rejecting student claim that university had duty to supervise stu-
dent's conduct with respect to use of fraternity owned trampoline); Swanson v.
Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding college not
liable for injuries suffered at intramural softball game).
41. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 336.
42. See id. Intercollegiate athletes, unlike their private counterparts, generate
millions of dollars for the university. See id. Due to this distinct difference between
student-athletes and private students, it is fair that student-athletes have a special
relationship with their universities. See id. Colleges do owe a heightened duty of
care to student-athletes. See id.; see also supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
1999]
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ized by mutual dependence." 4 For these reasons, universities
should owe a special duty to their athletes.44
1. Student-Athletes as Employees
Currently the NCAA has an amateur system in place. 45 Ama-
teurism focuses on the idea that students are rewarded for their
efforts by receiving an education rather than monetary compensa-
tion.46 Some commentators criticize this arrangement because
many of these athletes generate "substantial revenue for major col-
lege athletic departments. '47 Despite this criticism, courts have re-
fused to recognize the relationship between student-athlete and
university as an employee-employer relationship. 48
2. Differences Between Student-Athletes and Private Students
The differences between student-athletes and private students
illustrate another reason why universities should owe student-ath-
letes a heightened duty of care.49 The most basic distinction in-
volves the control universities maintain over their student-
athletes.50 The time commitment required for an athlete partici-
pating in a sport is similar to that of a full-time job, and it may be
more physically or emotionally demanding. 51
43. Rhim, supra note 8, at 336. These three important differences justify im-
posing a heightened standard of care on universities where their student-athletes
are involved. See id.
44. See id.; see also infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
45. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 329-30.
46. See id at 330. The NCAA provides its athletes with an environment to
learn, tuition, room, board and books. See id.
47. Rhim, supra note 8, at 329.
48. See id. at 336. Earlier cases found that student-athletes seeking workmen's
compensation after being injured while participating in a sport can be considered
employees for that purpose only. See University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d
423, 423 (Colo. 1953). Recent cases have refused to consider student-athletes as
employees for purposes of workers' compensation because scholarships are not
employment agreements. See Rhim supra note 8, at 336-37.
49. See Whang, supra note 9, at 43.
50. See id This is the key distinction. See id. Athletes' attendance at college is
based on different terms than most non-athletes. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 889.
While non-athletes may also be bound by a financial aid statement, athletes are
additionally obligated under the National Letter of Intent. See id. The National
Letter of Intent is an agreement between the student-athlete and the university
compelling the student's attendance at the university. See id. It prohibits an ath-
lete's ability to play a sport for another university. See id.
51. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 891-92. Athletes train year round. See id. at
891. Athletes are busy with "[p]re- and postseason activities, weight training, and
conditioning.... ." Id Calculations determined that at a Division I school, basket-
ball players would earn an hourly wage of $3.75 and football players would earn
the equivalent of $4.70 an hour. See id. Therefore, it is unfair to say that scholar-
[Vol. 6: p. 219
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Additionally, university athletic departments control virtually
all aspects of the lives of student-athletes, including social activities
and academic decisions.5 2 Often, athletic coaches and departments
encourage student-athletes to select less demanding majors so that
they can have more time to devote to athletics. 55 In some cases,
athletes do not even look at course descriptions or educational re-
quirements because coaches automatically register the students for
a selected curriculum. 54 It is "[t]his limited personal autonomy
during college [which] distinguishes the student-athlete from the
private student. '55
ships equal a "free ride." See id. During the actual season it is impossible to study
because players are exhausted. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 892. UCLA basketball
player Charles O'Bannon emphasized this. See id. He stated that studying time for
the team was from eight to ten at night. See id. On the many days when athletes
are tired, O'Bannon observed, eight to ten is late at night and it is difficult to
concentrate on studying. See id. One professor and former college football player
noted "'It's not like working at Macy's .... None of my [non-athlete] students is
expected to risk his body every day. Most people never deal with that kind of
exhaustion, with the exception of the military.'" Id. at 890.
Additionally, student-athletes may not be equipped emotionally to determine
what is in their best interest. Mitten defines a competitive athlete as:
one who participates in an organized team or individual sport that re-
quires regular competition against others as a central component, places
a high premium on excellence and achievement .... Another important
facet of competitive activity is that the athlete may not be able to use
proper judgment in determining whether to extricate himself or herself
from the competitive event, should that become necessary ....
Mitten, supra note 1, at 133.
52. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 891. This includes such activities as booster
functions. See Davis, supra note 33, at 93. This takes important time away from
studying and other activities chosen by the athlete. See id. Because of the impor-
tance of athletics at most universities to generate revenue, it is difficult to maintain
a balance between athletics and education. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 879.
Often, due to the control that universities maintain over their athletes, an athlete's
education becomes secondary to athletics. See id. at 879-80.
53. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 897. This is not the case in all universities.
There have been more and more cases, however, of athletes who leave a university
after four years without a degree. See The Goal of Graduation, GRAND RAPIDS PREss,
July 13, 1997, at B2. A 1996 University of Michigan study estimated that only 74%
of its athletes graduate with a degree. See id.; see also, Lorence, supra note 2, at 354
(noting Northeastern study that says that more than 70% of full scholarship ath-
letes never oraduate). One study estimated that 50% of all varsity athletes leave
college without a degree. See id. A 1985 report estimated that only 25% of basket-
ball players and 30% of football players graduate within 5 years at a university. See
id. For African-American players, the number dropped to 20%. See id.
54. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 338; see also Davis, supra note 33, at 993. One
former student-athlete discussed his negative experiences with the control that his
university exercised over his academics. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 895. He said
that coaches picked all of his classes and arranged for his summer job. See id. He
entered college with plans to be a sports broadcaster, but instead ended up first in
the business school and later the physical education department. See id. at 895-96.
Four years after enrolling in college, he left without a college degree. See id. at 895.
55. Rhim, supra note 8, at 338.
1999]
9
McGirt: Do Universities Have a Special Duty of Care to Protect Student-At
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
228 VnILANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
3. Special Relationships Between Universities and Student-Athletes
The relationship between student-athletes and universities can
be characterized as one of mutual dependence. 56 Student-athletes
depend on universities to receive an education. 57 They also de-
pend on colleges to help them improve their athletic skills in pur-
suit of careers as professional athletes.58
In return, student-athletes provide economic and non-eco-
nomic benefits for their universities. 59 Successful student-athletes
increase attendance at sporting events and attract corporate spon-
sors.60 Furthermore, successful student-athletes generate school
enthusiasm, facilitate recruitment and attract national media
exposure.61
In sum, several important differences distinguish student-ath-
letes from private students. 62 This does not necessarily imply that
private students are less valuable to universities than student-ath-
letes, but rather that the value of private students is manifested dif-
ferently. 63 Due to the distinctions between student-athletes and
56. See id. at 339; see also Davis, supra note 33, at 92. One example of courts
using mutual dependence to find a duty of care is when the plaintiff has some
existing or potential economic advantage over the defendant. See id. In these
cases, defendants are expected to protect plaintiffs because of the plaintiffs expec-
tation of protection resulting from the defendant's financial gain. See Rhim, supra
note 8, at 339.
57. See id Athletes receive this through scholarships, physical and mental
training and discipline. See id. Scholarships often provide athletes with the only
opportunity to attend college. See id.
58. See id. at 341. Student-athletes depend on colleges to provide them with
substantial media coverage, allowing athletes to market their skills. See Whang,
supra note 9, at 43.
59. See id. at 39. Student-athletes "generate ticket sales, alumni gifts, television
coverage and post-season bowl bonuses . . . ." Lorence, supra note 2, at 353.
60. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 339. In 1989, the University of Michigan re-
ceived $18.5 million in revenues with $7.4 million from football receipts alone. See
id. at 340. The colleges sending athletes to the 1989 bowl games shared $57 mil-
lion in revenue. See Lorence, supra note 2, at 354.
61. See Rhim, supra note 8, at 340.
62. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 890. Because universities provide athletes
with scholarships and other perks, athletes are expected to perform certain tasks
that private students are not. See id. at 888. This distinguishes them from private
students and places them in a unique and special relationship with universities. See
id. at 889. Another difference is the student-athlete's willingness to participate in a
sport in return for an education. See id. This is often the only way that a student-
athlete can afford to attend college. See id. This is quite different from private
students whose attendance at a university indicates that they have other means to
provide for college. See id.
63. See id. at 879. "'Star athletes, unlike other students, are truly assets of the
university and are often viewed in terms of their potential to generate revenue
rather than as students to be educated.'" Id. at 879 (quoting Marianne Jennings
and Lynn Ziokio, Student-Athletes, Athlete Agents and Five Year Eligibility: An Environ-
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private students, as well as the fact that universities treat student-
athletes differently, courts could logically characterize the relation-
ship between universities and student-athletes as special.
III. ANALYSIS
Many courts have imposed a duty of care on universities when
a student-athlete is injured, although some courts still refuse to find
a special relationship between student-athletes and their universi-
ties.64 This section examines the various results of lawsuits brought
by student-athletes against their universities. 65 This section also ex-
amines the potential liability of coaches for the injuries of student-
athletes under their direction. 66
A. Courts Concluding that the Relationship Between Student-Athletes
and their Universities is Special
In Orr v. Brigham Young University,67 a student-athlete sued Brig-
ham Young University (BYU) for failing to provide adequate medi-
cal care when the student-athlete suffered a back injury in a football
ment of Contractual Interference, Trade Restraint and High-Stake Payments, 66 U. DET. L.
REV. 179, 209 (1989)). The authors also note that universities might actually not
see a return on their investment in student-athletes. See id. After providing stu-
dent-athletes with tuition, room and board, and other perks, a student-athlete
might decide to transfer, drop out of school or no longer participate in a sport. See
Emerick, supra note 8, at 879. If such actions were taken by a private student, a
university would not be losing any money, since the student expenses would have
already been paid. See id.
64. See, e.g., Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 576 So.
2d 978, 978 (La. 1991) (holding no duty owed by university to student-athlete who
suffered broken neck while participating in school tournament).
65. For a discussion of suits brought by student-athletes, see infra notes 67-127
and accompanying text. Courts have been much more willing to impose a duty on
schools when the school involved is a high school. See, e.g., Roventini v. Pasadena
Indep. School Dist., 981 F. Supp. 1013, 1013 (S.D. Tx. 1997) (holding district lia-
ble for student death due to heat exhaustion during practice); Benitz v. New York
City Bd. of Education, 541 N.E.2d 29, 29 (N.Y. 1989) (finding that high schools
have duty to protect student-athletes from risk by exercising reasonable care);
Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 552 (Ind. 1987) (holding
school and coach breached duty to exercise reasonable care in supervision); Leahy
v. School Bd. of Hernando County, 450 So. 2d 883, 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(concluding that high school owed duty to supervise and provide proper instruc-
tion to students).
66. For a discussion of the liability of coaches to student-athletes, see infra
notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
67. No. 96-4015, 1997 WL 143600 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).
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game.68 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A,69 which
Utah has adopted, Orr had to show that he had a special relation-
ship with BYU. 70 Orr argued that the district court erred by grant-
ing summary judgment in favor of BYU due to lack of a special
relationship. 7' On appeal, he submitted that universities owe a spe-
cial duty to student-athletes greater than that owed to private stu-
dents. 72 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that, perhaps, such a du-
ty should exist.73 The Court stated that it was constrained not to
find a special duty in this case, however, because Utah case law does
not recognize such a duty.7 4 Specifically, the court stated that, "[a] s
a federal court, we are reticent to expand state law in the absence of
clear guidance from Utah's highest court, or at least a strong and
well-reasoned trend among other courts which Utah might find
persuasive, in favor of such expansion." 75 The Tenth Circuit dis-
cussed the conclusion of the Third Circuit that a special relation-
ship does exist between student-athletes and universities, but
68. See id. at *1. Orr alleged that he was injured while playing football for
BYU. See id He contended that "enormous pressure" from coaches induced him
to continue playing, which further injured his back. See id. Off claimed that BYU
breached its duty of care in diagnosis and treatment of his back injuries, acting in a
way that caused him increased harm. See id
69. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
70. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. The Restatement imposes a duty of care
only when a special relationship exists. See id. For a further discussion of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
71. See On, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. Orr sued the University on several
theories:
that BYU owed a duty of care to him based on a special relationship cre-
ated by his status as a student-athlete at BYU; that BYU's conduct created
a situation in which playing him would cause him harm, thus imposing
on BYU an affirmative duty to protect him from injury; that BYU allowed
its trainers to practice medicine without a license; and that BYU breached
its duty of care to him in its diagnosis and treatment of his medical
injuries.
Id. at *1.
72. See id. at *2.
73. See id.
74. See id. The court quoted Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah
1986) to support their conclusion, but it did not consider the issue. See Orr, 1997
WL 143600, at *2. Instead, the court stated that there was no Utah precedent for
this case. See id. The Tenth Circuit had in the past refused to expand state law
without some state precedent. See id.; see also Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 82, 87 (10th
Cir. 1993) (declining to expand concept of special relationship between police and
citizens beyond boundaries of Kansas courts).
75. Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. The court stated that there appears to be no
"trend" in Utah or elsewhere which would impose a duty on BYU based on a spe-
cial relationship. See id.
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distinguished Orr on the basis that the Third Circuit relied on cases
involving high school, rather than university athletics. 76
In Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College,77 the parents of a lacrosse
player who suffered a heart attack during a practice session brought
a wrongful death and survival action against Gettysburg College.78
The parents argued that a special relationship existed between stu-
dent-athletes and universities, which imposed a special duty of care
on universities. 79 They argued further that harm to student-ath-
letes was foreseeable.80
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
college, based on the conclusion that the risk that a young, healthy
athlete suffering a heart attack was not reasonably foreseeable and
that the college had no duty to guard against such an event.81 The
76. See id. n.1 (discussing Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360
(3d Cir. 1993)).
77. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
78. See id. at 1362. Drew Kleinknecht was recruited by Gettysburg College to
play for the college's Division III intercollegiate lacrosse team. See id. at 1362-63.
Because lacrosse is a contact sport that frequently leads to injuries including con-
cussions, the college took measures to ensure the students' safety. See id. at 1363.
Specifically, the college employed two full-time athletic trainers who were certified
by the National Athletic Trainers Association. See id. The trainers were required to
know cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and standard first aid. See id. Addi-
tionally, twelve student trainers were on hand. See id. Student trainers were as-
signed to all spring games and practices. See id. They were not, however, assigned
to fall practices because those off-season practices were held only to teach skills.
See id.
On September 16, 1988, Drew participated in fall practice. See id. No trainers
attended the practice, but there were two coaches present. See id. Neither coach
was certified in CPR, nor did they have a radio on the field in the case of an
emergency. See id. While participating in a drill, Drew suffered cardiac arrest and
was later pronounced dead. See id.
79. See id The Kleinknechts contended that the college breached its duty of
care by not providing adequate preventive measures in the case of a medical emer-
gency. See id. The Kleinknechts and the college disagreed about what happened
immediately following Kleinknecht's collapse. See id. at 1364-65. The college
maintained that a coach was immediately at Kleinknecht's side and that the
school's emergency plan (assessing the injured's condition and then sending for a
trainer and ambulance) was properly followed. See id. at 1363. According to the
college, an ambulance arrived on the field within 8 to 10 minutes after
Kleinknecht collapsed. See id. at 1364. The Kleinknechts maintain that an ambu-
lance did not arrive on the scene for approximately 22 minutes. See id. at 1365.
The Kleinknechts argue that the steps taken by the college were not adequate
preventive measures. See id. at 1366.
80. See id. at 1366. It is foreseeable that athletes may suffer "severe and even
life threatening injuries while engaged in athletic activity .... " Id. at 1369.
81. See id. at 1362. Prior to Kleinknecht's collapse, he had no medical history
of heart problems. See id. at 1365. Both a Gettysburg College physician and the
Kleinknecht family physician confirmed this through medical records. See id. Due
to Kleinknecht's appearance of overall good health, the court held that there was
"no duty to anticipate and guard against the chance of a fatal arrhythmia in a
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Third Circuit reversed and remanded for further findings based on
the determination that the college owed a duty to its student-ath-
letes based on the existence of a special relationship.8 2 The court
stated that a duty of care to ensure the health of athletes exists,
particularly when a school utilizes a student-athlete to help gener-
ate interest in the school.83 The court stated that the "distinction
[between student and athlete] serves to limit the class of students to
whom a college owes the duty of care that arises here. 84 The Third
Circuit further asserted that a university owes a duty to student-ath-
letes when the risk of harm is both unreasonable and foreseeable.8 5
In recognizing that a special relationship exists between stu-
dent-athletes and universities, the Third Circuit emphasized three
important factors. 86 First, the court found pertinent the fact that
young and healthy athlete." See id. at 1362. The court also found that the college
did not negligently breach any duty that might exist because their actions after
Kleinknecht's heart attack were reasonable. See id,
82. See id. at 1375. The court agreed with the Kleinknechts, basing their deci-
sion on the Hanson v. Kynast case. See id. (citing Hanson v. Kynast, Mo. CA-828
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986)). The Hanson
court implicitly held that the university owed a duty of care to the plaintiff student-
athlete. See id. When Kleinknecht collapsed, he was participating in a school
scheduled practice for an intercollegiate sport for which he had been recruited.
See id. at 1367. He was not acting on his own and was not engaged in his own
private affairs. See id. Based on this, the Third Circuit held that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania would find that a similar duty exists on the facts of the
Kleinknecht case. See id, The court noted that other cases had found a similar duty.
See id. (citing Beckett v. Clinton Prairie Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind.
1987) (high school personnel have duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care
for safety of student-athletes under their authority)); Leahy v. Sch. Bd. of Her-
nando County, 450 So. 2d 883, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant school
board owed duty to properly supervise spring football practice as approved school
activity in which school employees had authority to control behavior of students).
83. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1368. The court emphasized the distinction
between private students pursuing their own interests and activities and student-
athletes who have been recruited and are participating in intercollegiate, school
sponsored sports. See id
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1369. In considering foreseeability, the court noted that it is not
the foreseeability of a specific event that determines duty of care. See id. Rather,
"[t]he concept of foreseeability means the likelihood of the occurrence of a gen-
eral type of risk rather than the likelihood of the occurrence of the precise chain
of events leading to the injury." Id. quoting Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co.,
524 F.2d 19, 28 n.8 (3d Cir. 1975)) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, the risk of harm must be unreasonable. See id. "No person can
be expected to guard against harm from events which are not reasonably to be
anticipated at all." Id. at 1370. Although defendants are not required to guard
against all risks, generally foreseeable risks must be guarded against. See id. While
it may not have been foreseeable that Kleinknecht specifically would suffer cardiac
arrest, it was foreseeable that a life threatening injury could occur to one of the
players. See id. The failure of the college to protect against such a risk was unrea-
sonable. See id.
86. See id at 1368-71.
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the student-athlete was actively recruited by the university to partici-
pate on its lacrosse team.8 7 Second, the court emphasized that, at
the time of his collapse, the student-athlete was acting in his capac-
ity as an athlete rather than as a private student.88 Third, the court
focused on foreseeability and reasonableness, finding that the
heightened duty of care that a university owes its student-athletes
exists only when the risk of harm is both foreseeable and unreason-
ably significant.89
In Knapp v. Northwestern University,90 the Seventh Circuit held
that a special relationship existed between a student-athlete and a
university.91 Although the facts of this case differed markedly from
the Kleinknecht case, the court found that universities have a duty to
protect their student-athletes when the chance of injury is high.92
Knapp was recruited to play basketball by Northwestern Uni-
versity.93 Prior to attending Northwestern and while participating
in a high school basketball game, however, Knapp suffered cardiac
arrest.94 The university assured Knapp that, regardless of his medi-
cal condition and potential inability to play basketball, the school
would honor its scholarship commitment to him.95 Subsequently,
the university and the Big Ten Conference declared Knapp perma-
87. See id. at 1367-68. The court stated that "the College recruited Drew for its
own benefit, probably thinking that his skill at lacrosse would bring favorable at-
tention and so aid the College in attracting other students." Id. at 1368. Thus, the
court implied that the heightened duty of care was based, at least partially, on the
benefits that colleges receive from athletes participation in school athletics. See id
88. See id. at 1368.
89. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1369-70. The court stated "[i]f a duty is to be
imposed, the foreseeable risk of harm must be unreasonable." Id. at 1369.
90. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
91. See id. at 473.
92. See id. at 476.
93. See id. While in high school, Knapp was one of the best basketball players
in Illinois. See id. Therefore, Northwestern and other universities actively re-
cruited Knapp. See id. During Knapp's junior year in high school, Northwestern
orally offered him a basketball scholarship, which Knapp accepted. See id.
94. See id. Paramedics, using cardiopulmonary resuscitation, electric shocks
and drug injections, were able to bring Knapp back to life. See id. Subsequently,
Knapp had an "internal cardioverter-defibrillator" placed in his abdomen. See id
The device delivered an electric shock if Knapp's heartbeat became irregular. See
id.
95. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 476. Northwestern made this promise, without
placing any conditions on his participation as a member of the basketball team,
the day after Knapp's cardiac arrest. See id. Knapp and his family were aware of
the increased risks, including the risk of death, involved in Knapp's continuing to
play basketball. See id. Yet, they were still willing to sign waivers of liability but
Northwestern would not permit this. See id.
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nently ineligible to play college basketball because of his
condition.96
In response, Knapp filed suit and a federal district court found
Knapp medically eligible to play intercollegiate basketball for
Northwestern. 97 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision and allowed Northwestern to make the final
determination on Knapp's eligibility.98 The court stated that "col-
leges and universities can exercise a duty of care and protect their
student-athletes against foreseeable injuries."99 Although the Sev-
enth Circuit used different language than the Third Circuit used in
Kleinknecht, "the decision in Knapp supports the legal recognition of
a duty of care owed to student-athletes by colleges based on the
'special relationship' between the two." 1°°
96. See id- Originally, the Northwestern team physician declared Knapp ineli-
gible to play basketball for Northwestern's team for the 1995-1996 season. See id. at
476-77. The doctor based his decision on medical records (in which treating physi-
cians suggested that Knapp should not play competitive basketball), a physical ex-
amination by one of the other team doctors, recommendations and guidelines
from the Bethesda Conferences (two medical conferences held specifically to de-
velop recommendations by physicians on the "eligibility of athletes with cardiovas-
cular abnormalities to compete in sports") and recommendations of doctors with
whom the team doctors consulted. See id. at 477. At the end of the 1995-1996
basketball season, Northwestern declared Knapp permanently ineligible to play
basketball for Northwestern. See id. The athletic director stated that "Northwest-
ern will never voluntarily let Knapp play intercollegiate basketball as a Wildcat."
Id.
97. See id. The district court based its decision on the testimony and affidavits
of two Northwestern experts and three of Knapp's experts. See id. All of the ex-
perts agreed that because of his condition, playing basketball placed Knapp at a
greater risk of death than other male athletes. See id. at 477-78. They also recog-
nized that the defibrillator in Knapp's body had never been tested under the con-
ditions of basketball and that no other player (at the collegiate or professional
level) had ever played basketball with an internal defibrillator. See id. at 478. The
experts disagreed as to the extent of the increased risk that Knapp would face. See
id. Knapp's experts felt that the risk was insubstantial or acceptable, while North-
western experts felt that it was a significant and unacceptable risk. See id. The
district court enjoined Northwestern from excluding Knapp from playing on its
basketball team. See id. at 477.
98. See id. at 484. To prevail under the Rehabilitation Act, Knapp had to show
four things: "(1) he is disabled as defined by the Act; (2) he is otherwise qualified
for the position sought; (3) he has been excluded from the position solely because
of his disability; and (4) the position exists as part of a program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance." Id. at 478 (citation omitted). The court disputed
whether Knapp was "otherwise qualified for the position sought" and whether he is
disabled under the meaning of the act. See id.
99. Rhim, supra note 8, at 347.
100. Knapp v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d at 478. After declaring
Knapp ineligible to play basketball, the university treated Knapp as an ordinary
student in that it did not restrict "him from playing pick-up basketball games, us-
ing recreational facilities on campus, or exerting himself physically on his own
.. .. Id. at 476. This shows the different treatment that universities afford their
athletes, illustrating the existence of a special relationship.
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In Kennedy v. Syracuse University,10 1 a student-athlete was injured
during a gymnastics practice.10 2 At the time of the injury, no ath-
letic trainers were present which forced the coach and teammates
to provide emergency first aid to Kennedy.103 Kennedy sued on
the theory that the university owed its student-athletes a duty to
have a trainer present at all athletic practices. 10 4  Although the
court ruled in favor of the university because Kennedy was unable
to show proximate cause, the court did not dispute that a university
owes its student-athletes a duty of care. 10 5 Similarly, the university
did not deny that it owed a reasonable duty of care to its student-
athletes. 10 6 In sum, both the court and the university clearly pre-
sumed that a special relationship existed between the student-ath-
lete and the university that imposed a heightened duty of care on
the university.
The decisions in Kleinknecht, Knapp and Kennedy each recog-
nized that a special relationship exists between student-athletes and
universities. 10 7 In recognizing a special relationship, the three
courts necessarily recognized the corresponding duty of care on the
part of the respective universities.108 Unlike the courts in Klein-
knecht, Knapp and Kennedy, however, the Orr court held that the uni-
versity did not owe its student-athletes any duty of care because of a
special relationship.10 9
101. No. 94-CV-269, 1995 WL 548710 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1995).
102. See id. at *1. The student, Russell Kennedy, sustained an injury to his
wrist while practicing on the high bar. See id. The injury was the result of a failed
hand grip which "caus[ed] his wrist to lock in place and be slammed against the
bar as his body continued to swing over the bar." Id.
103. See id. Before the grip could be removed, the straps had to be tightened
first. See id. Kennedy argued that this tightening of the straps by teammates, due
to the lack of a trainer being present, exacerbated his injuries. See id. at *2.
104. See id. at *1. Kennedy made three arguments: (1) the university was neg-
ligent in not having a trainer present at practices; (2) because he was a scholarship
athlete, a contract existed obligating the university to have a trainer present at
practice at all times; and (3) the university breached a voluntarily assumed duty to
have a trainer at athletic practices. See id.
105. See Kennedy v. Syracuse University, No. 94-CV-269, 1995 WL 548710, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1995). Rather, the court found that there was no cause of
action because the student-athiete did not establish proximate cause. See id
106. See id. Instead, Syracuse moved for summary judgment on the basis of
the student-athlete's failure to show proximate cause. See id&
107. For a discussion of these three cases and the courts finding of a special
relationship, see supra notes 78-108 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of the court's determination that universities owe their
student-athletes a duty of care, see supra notes 39-63 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the requirements necessary to satisfy a duty of care claim, see supra
notes 8-38 and accompanying text.
109. See Orr v. Brigham Young University, No. 96-4015, 1997 WL 143600, at *2
(10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997). For a further discussion of the Orr court's decision, see
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Although the three factors laid out in Kleinknecht, Knapp and
Kennedy applied equally to the facts in Orr, the Orr court declined to
consider them.110 First, the Kleinknecht, Knapp and Kennedy courts
each emphasized the relevance of recruitment.' The Orr court,
however, did not discuss whether the university recruited Orr to
play football.112 If the university did not recruit Orr as an athlete,
the court could have distinguished the case, but the court failed to
consider it.
Second, the Kleinknecht court emphasized the relevance of
whether the student-athlete was acting in his capacity as an athlete
at the time of the injury.11 3 Orr suffered his injury while participat-
ing in a school sponsored athletic event that benefited the uni-
versity. 114
Third, the Klinknecht court considered whether there was a
foreseeable and unreasonably significant risk of harm. The Orr
court did not discuss this factor even though a foreseeable and, per-
haps, unreasonably significant risk of harm exists when an athlete
participated in sports with a back injury. 115
supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Even though all three of the previously
mentioned decisions were reached before the decision in Orr, the only decision
the Orr court alluded to was the Kleinknecht decision. See id. at *2 n.1. In a foot-
note, the court quickly disregarded Kleinknecht because it relied on cases developed
in the high school arena. See id. The Orr court stated that there was no indication
that the Utah Supreme Court would adopt the Kleinknecht rationale. See id.
110. The three factors emphasized by the Kleinknecht court were: (1) that the
student-athletes were recruited by the school and the school thereby benefited; (2)
that at the time of injury the student was acting in his/her capacity as an athlete
rather than that of a private student; and (3) that the risk of harm is foreseeable
and unreasonable. See Kleinknecht v. Getysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1368-71.
For an expanded discussion of these factors, see supra notes 87-90 and accompany-
ing text.
111. See Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 216 (discussing Kleinknecht decision).
The court stated that the school's recruitment showed that the school intended to
benefit from Kleinknecht's participation in its lacrosse program. See id. Further-
more, in dicta, the court stated "that the result probably would have been different
if the student had been participating in intramural sports." Id.; see also Rhim, supra
note 8, at 347 (discussing Knapp decision and stating that universities have general
duty to protect their student-athletes "for the sport in which they were recruited
and when the severity of potential injury is high").
112. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2.
113. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1371. This is a critical factor. See Rhim, supra
note 8, at 343. It has been widely held that universities do not owe private students
a duty of care when students are engaged in their own activities. See supra notes 8-
36 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of athletes' injuries occurring during a university sanc-
tioned event, see supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
115. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *1. Orr claimed that despite the coaches'
knowledge of his injuries, he was pressured to continue playing, resulting in his
exacerbating his back injuries. See id.
[Vol. 6: p. 219
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss1/8
A UNIVERSITY's DUTY TO STUDENT-ATHLETES
In Orr, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply these factors based
on Beach v. University of Utah.116 The Beach case, however, is distin-
guishable because it involved a private student rather than a stu-
dent-athlete."17 Courts have generally not found a special rela-
tionship or a corresponding duty of care in cases involving private
students."" The Orr court feared that if it found a special relation-
ship, Utah's colleges and universities would face an overly expan-
sive duty."19 The court failed to recognize, however, that the class
of people to whom a duty would be owed would be strictly limited
to student-athletes. 120
While courts have increasingly recognized a special duty of
care owed to student-athletes, the Orr decision does not reflect this
trend. In Orr, the Tenth Circuit relied exclusively on old case law
and did not distinguish the relationship between universities and
student-athletes from the relationship between universities and pri-
vate students.' 21 As discussed in this Comment, however, these rela-
tionships are inherently different.' 22 Student-athletes are treated
differently in that they receive benefits that private students do not
receive.' 23 In addition, student-athletes benefit universities in ways
that private students do not.124
116. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); see also Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. The
Tenth Circuit considered Beach as the governing Utah case. See id. The court
states that Beach defined the boundaries of Utah law. See id.
117. See Beach, at 413.
118. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. In Beach, the Utah Supreme Court found
no special duty of care because universities have an educational, not custodial,
relationship with their students. See Beach, 726 P.2d at 419. This holding was not
unique, which is reflected by the disappearance of the in loco parentis doctrine.
For a discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine, see supra notes 16-23 and accom-
panying text.
119. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2.
120. See Whang, supra note 9, at 49; see also, Emerick, supra note 8, at 887-88.
Not only would the class of potential litigants be strictly limited, but it is wrong to
deny justice based on a fear of increased litigation. See id "In addition, the time
and expense attendant to bringing a lawsuit - attorneys' fees, expert witness fees
and court costs - render it unlikely that a flood of litigation will ensue if this cause
of action is recognized." Id at 888 (referring specifically to recognizing cause of
action by student-athletes against universities) (citations omitted).
121. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *2. The court relied completely on the Beach
case. See id. Not only is it outdated, but the facts differ completely from those in
Orr. See id. Recent cases have dealt specifically with the relationship between stu-
dent-athletes and universities. The Orr court did not consider this and continues
to rely on a case involving a private student rather than a student-athlete. See id.
122. See supra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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B. Liability of Coaches
As discussed previously, courts have been increasingly willing
to impose a duty of care on universities toward their student-ath-
letes.' 25 None of the cases, however, has involved a suit against a
university coach. 126 Injured student-athletes, however, do some-
times sue their coaches because of the direct control that coaches
exert over athletes and athletic events.' 27 This Section discusses
the basis for coach liability and the duties that a coach owes to a
student-athlete. 128
Generally, the basis of liability for coaches is negligence. 129 To
prevail on a negligence theory, an athlete must first prove that the
coach breached the requisite duty of care. 130 A coach owes to ath-
letes a duty of reasonable care to avoid creating a foreseeable risk of
harm.' 5 '
As long as coaches satisfy this duty, they will not be held liable
for injuries resulting from the inherent dangers of the sport.'3 2
The responsibilities of a coach can be divided into the following
eight duties: (1) supervision; (2) training and instruction; (3) en-
suring the proper use of safe equipment; (4) providing competent
and responsible personnel; (5) warning of latent dangers; (6) pro-
viding prompt and proper medical care; (7) preventing injured ath-
125. For a discussion of the recent change in the courts, see supra notes 64-112
and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the four cases, see supra notes 64-127 and accompany-
ing text.
127. See Anthony S. McCaskey and Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal
Liability of Coaches for a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 8
(1996). Coaches are frequently the principal defendants in lawsuits brought by
injured athletes. See id. at 10-11. Coaches are under enormous pressure from uni-
versities to succeed and often their salaries and bonuses are based on their team's
success. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 876. As a result, coaches are both directly
and indirectly responsible for an athlete's progress. See id. There is often a "win-at-
all-costs" mentality, and the best interests of the athlete are not always considered.
See id. It is at this point that coaches may become liable for negligence. See id.
128. For a discussion of the liability of coaches and the duties coaches owe to
student-athletes, see infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
129. See McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 127, at 12-13.
130. See id. at 14. The four factors necessary to prevail on a negligence claim
are:
(1) a duty requiring a person to conform to a standard of conduct that
protects others from unreasonable risk of harm; (2) a breach of that duty
(i.e., the person's failure to conform to the standard of conduct); (3) a
causal connection between the breach of the duty and the resulting in-
jury (i.e., proximate cause and cause in fact); and (4) resulting injury or
damages.
Id. at 13-14.
131. See GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW § 7.4 at 220.
132. See McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 127, at 15.
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letes from competing; and (8) matching athletes of similar com-
petitive levels.133 The main duty of a coach, however, is to mini-
mize the risk of injury to all participants.1 34
In Lamorie v. Warner Pacific College,'35 the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals held a basketball coach liable for allowing an injured athlete
to participate in a basketball scrimmage.' 36 The court concluded
that the coach breached his duty of care by requiring Lamorie to
participate in the scrimmage, which created an unreasonable risk of
further injury. 137
It is interesting to note that Orr only sued the university and
not his coaches.138 Orr may have prevailed, however, if he had
sued his coaches for negligence under the argument that his
coaches violated their duty to prevent an injured athlete from com-
peting - the same argument that succeeded in Lamorie.'3 9
Although Orr's coaches knew that he had suffered a back injury,
they continued to pressure him to play. 140
Courts have also imposed liability on third parties for the ac-
tions of coaches, under the theories of respondeat superior and vi-
carious liability.' 41 For example, if a coach is negligent, the uni-
versity that employs the coach may be held liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. 42 This makes sense because coaches
are the agents who realize the goals that universities set for their
133. See id. at 15-16.
134. See id. at 15. The term "participants" is defined broadly. See id. The
term encompasses all people involved in the sports activity. See id. Therefore, this
includes referees, assistants, team physicians and even scorekeepers. See McCaskey
and Biedzynski, supra note 127, at 15.
135. 850 P.2d 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
136. See id. at 402. The injured athlete, Lamorie, received a basketball schol-
arship to attend Warner Pacific College. See id. at 401. While playing football at
his church, Lamorie injured his nose and was required to wear a nose cast. See id.
Lamorie told his coach that doctors advised him not to participate in any athletic
exercises. See id. There was bruising and his eyes were almost swollen shut. See id.
Despite these warnings and Lamorie's visible injuries, the coach asked him to par-
tcipate in a basketball scrimmage. See id. at 402. Fearful of losing his scholarship,
Lamorie participated in the scrimmage and further aggiavated his injures. See id,
137. See id.
138. See Orr v. Brigham Young University, No. 96-4015, 1997 WL 143600, at *1
(10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).
139. See McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 127, at 15. Whenever there is
an unreasonable risk that an athlete may aggravate an existing injury, a coach may
be held liable for negligence. See id. at 33-34.
140. See Orr, 1997 WL 143600, at *1.
141. See McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 127, at 40-41.
142. See id.
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sports teams by directing student-athletes. 143 Although student-ath-
letes have sometimes succeeded in suits against their universities
under the theories of respondeat superior and vicarious liability,
negligence suits against coaches are more common.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that situations exist in which a university should owe
a duty of care to its student-athletes. 144 This duty should exist for
two main reasons. First, the athletic endeavors of student-athletes
benefit the universities they represent. These benefits, both eco-
nomic and non-economic, are substantial.145 Second, universities
exercise control over student-athletes that significantly exceeds the
control that universities exercise over private students.' 46 As a re-
sult, a duty of care that exceeds the duty owed to regular students
should exist.' 47
Courts have faced several related issues. First, courts have
struggled to determine the appropriate extent of such a heightened
duty of care. 48 Second, although courts have recognized a height-
ened duty to protect high school students from injuries, they have
been more reluctant to recognize a heightened duty at the college
level, though that is slowly changing.149 Finally, courts have found
it difficult to adopt clear rules regarding liability to student-athletes
because establishing the appropriate duty requires a fact-specific in-
quiry in many cases.' 50
Since student-athletes are amateur athletes who do not reap the
financial benefits that professional athletes enjoy, some apparatus
should exist to compensate student-athletes who suffer avoidable
143. See Mitten, supra note 1, at 135. For example, many scholarships are re-
newable, and a player who does not comply with the coach risks losing his scholar-
ship at renewal time. See id. Fearing such consequences, many injured student-
athletes decide to play. See id.
144. See Hollingsworth, supra note 2, at 721.
145. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 874. Intercollegiate sport is a multi-million
dollar industry that generates revenues for universities through ticket sales, mer-
chandising, television contracts, alumni support and many other sources. See id.
Furthermore, universities derive collateral benefits such as publicity, visibility and
increased admission applications. See id.
146. See Whang, supra note 9, at 50-51.
147. See Emerick, supra note 8, at 888-89. Due to the extensive benefits that
athletes provide to universities, athletic programs often receive special status
within the university. See id. at 875. Similarly, it is fair that athletes receive special
status in suits against universities. See id. at 888-89.
148. See Hollingsworth, supra note 2, at 721.
149. See id. at 713-15.
150. See Hirshberg, supra note 16, at 222.
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injuries. By consistently recognizing that universities owe student-
athletes a heightened duty of care, courts can ensure that student-
athletes will receive adequate protection. A university that reaps
the benefits of its intercollegiate athletic program should compen-
sate a student-athlete for a foreseeable injury that was caused be-
cause the university required the student-athlete to undertake an
unreasonable risk.
Michelle D. McGirt
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